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Convicts or Conquistadores?: Spanish Soldiers in the Seventeenth Century Pacific 
 
Abstract: The Spanish colonisation of the Philippines relied on yearly dispatches of soldiers 
across the Pacific from New Spain. While professional Spanish soldiers formed the backbone 
of missions of conquest and exploration, they were in reality numerically weak. Royal 
officials in Manila struggled throughout the century to cover the bare necessities of defence 
let alone extend Spanish domination across the region. Faced with a chronic shortage of 
voluntary recruits, officials in New Spain and the Philippines increasingly relied upon a 
multiethnic mix of criminals and vagabonds found in the urban centres and rural highways of 
New Spain, who were impressed and coerced into military service. At the same time, 
however, conditions experienced in the Philippines equally undermined the effectiveness of 
the military. Widespread shortages in silver and supplies meant that soldiers existed in a state 
of chronic poverty and many chose to desert or turn to criminality. Thus, by examining the 
Spanish side of conquest we find that loyalty to the project of empire amongst those who 
were supposedly its chief protagonists was often contingent. By closely examining the social 
composition of Spanish soldiers serving in the Philippines in the seventeenth century, this 
article directly challenges the assumption that all Spanish agents of the colonial project in the 
Pacific were motivated by goals of self-aggrandisement and personal enrichment.  
Word count: 10,078 
 
In 1565, a conquering party led by Miguel López de Legazpi sailed across the 
Pacific to establish a permanent Spanish settlement in the Philippines.
1
 Ever afterwards, the 
history of the archipelago was defined by its orientation towards the Pacific. More than 
thirteen thousand kilometres of ocean separated the islands from the nearest outpost of the 
Spanish empire, the Viceroyalty of New Spain. Yet, the Pacific crossing was enduring. 
Galleons plied Pacific waters between Manila and Acapulco for two hundred and fifty years, 
transporting cargoes of Chinese silks to New Spain and bringing back to Manila boatloads of 
soldiers, missionaries, silver and much needed supplies.
2
 Spanish territorial control 
eventually settled across most of the Visayas, Luzon and parts of Micronesia, with brief 
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Spanish settlements in the seventeenth century in the Moluccas, Mindanao, Taiwan and the 
Celebes islands.
3
 
Yet, within a historiography that lauds the transpacific galleon trade and charts the 
exploitation of indigenous Filipinos in the lead up to the revolutionary nineteenth century, 
very little has been written about the ordinary soldiers that acted as the agents of empire in 
this arena. Soldiers were nonetheless integral to the spread of Spanish control in the Pacific. 
They manned the galleons that patrolled the archipelago and transported silver and Chinese 
silks between Acapulco and Manila. They defended the islands against attacks by Dutch and 
Moro
4
 raiders, and they were essential for furthering the evangelisation and colonisation of 
indigenous peoples. Numerically, soldiers outnumbered other Spanish migrants to the 
Philippines seven-to-one, with approximately 15,600 soldiers making the Pacific crossing in 
the seventeenth century alone.
5
 Their presence within the archipelago has left a lasting impact 
on the Philippines and helps to account for the high levels of cultural and racial mingling 
between Spaniards and indigenous populations.
6
 Despite this, soldiers appear only as murky 
figures within the historiography of the early colonial Philippines.
7
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Where soldiers do appear within the historiography of the Philippines, they are 
presented simultaneously as pawns of their military leaders and as complicit and active 
participants of conquest. Historians of the Philippines have often assumed that soldiers’ 
interests were intertwined with those of their King and their military commanders, drawing 
on the famed image of the Spanish conquistadores who conquered the territories of New 
Spain and Peru and were richly rewarded with land and treasure for their efforts. The 
influential historian, John Leddy Phelan, reinforced the notion of a compliant and loyal 
soldiery very early on in the historiography of the colonial Philippines, by asserting that 
‘Spaniards of all classes ... were inspired by an almost limitless faith in their nation’s power 
and prestige.’8 Robert Reed later wrote that the colonisation of the Philippines was ‘a unified 
effort of soldiers, missionaries, bureaucrats and merchants in which all participants could 
reap their just material or spiritual rewards.’9 Renato Constantino, one of the great nationalist 
Filipino historians, concluded that all soldiers were motivated by the pursuit of ‘their private 
goals of enrichment while at the same time consolidating the rule of Spain. ... The 
instruments of pacification thus served the dual purpose of strengthening Spanish sovereignty 
and of enriching the men who had made possible the annexation of the territory.’ 10 
Subsequent historians have adopted these claims uncritically,
11
 while still others have gone 
even further, imbuing the soldiers of the Spanish Empire with the quality of brutalised 
murderers.
12
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By contrast, the archives tell us a very different story. In 1605, the attorney general 
of the Philippines, Don Hernando de los Ríos Coronel complained that the Spanish were 
losing face amongst indigenous Filipinos because of the disgraceful behaviour of the soldiers 
stationed in Manila, who regularly gambled away their wages and ‘afterwards they go about 
without their shoes and naked without their clothes.’ They would sell their arms and weapons 
to the indigenous population and ‘walk about begging for alms, making a thousand 
despicable acts amongst the unbelievers, so that only with dishonour they are called 
soldiers.’13 In 1626, Governor Fernando de Silva described the soldiers as ‘the scum of the 
entire Spanish nation,’ saying that most of the recruits were criminals and young boys with 
corrupt minds.
14
 In 1650 Governor Diego Fajardo Chacón reported that the soldiers were 
more often than not boys under the age of twelve, mulattos, Indians and ‘men of bad 
character’.15 Governor Juan Niño de Távora even described the soldiers as a threat to the 
overall project of colonisation, warning the King that the ‘great misery and labour’ endured 
by the soldiers of the presidios
16
 of the Philippines could have undesired consequences. He 
invoked the experience of mutiny amongst soldiers of Flanders by cautioning the King that 
‘nothing places that state of Flanders ... in a greater predicament than [soldiers’] mutinies.’17 
While confronting the myth of the quixotic conquistador, the research presented here 
also contributes to an emerging literature on the role of soldiers in early modern empire 
construction. Long considered the prerogative of military historians with an interest in 
charting the changing nature of service within the context of the military revolution,
18
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soldiers have been largely left out of early modern and labour histories.
19
 Phil Withington has 
recently suggested that their exclusion from early modern historiography derives in part from 
a prevalent assumption that soldiers – like other lower class or plebeian subjects – lacked 
social agency and political consciousness, and therefore very little could genuinely be said 
about them.
20
 Early modern historiography has tended instead to focus on the ‘chivalric’ and 
distinguished actions of the military elite, who better represent notions of military honour and 
patriotism dominant within the civic humanist imagination.
21
 While some fine examples of 
social history exist for soldiers that served in European armies,
22
 until recently there has been 
a paucity of similar texts dealing with soldiers that served in the expansion of European 
colonies.
23
 Our understanding of the place of soldiers within early modern empires stands in 
stark contrast to the history of sailors and maritime labour. With the ship described famously 
as ‘an early precursor of the factory’ and a site of collective labour,24 the maritime history of 
empire has been written as a labour history, replete with strikes, mutinies and the explicit 
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challenge to the state of early eighteenth century piracy.
25
 Sailors are thus written into the 
history of empire as active participants and sometimes even active detractors of empire.
26
 
Soldiers have traditionally attracted none of this romance. Especially within colonial Latin 
American historiography, they have been depicted as brutal conquistadors of indigenous 
victims of European domination, creating what one historian has termed ‘a neomythology of 
the good and evil twins, pairing an essentialized victim and victor, conquered and 
conqueror.’27 
Yet, an emerging literature on soldiers that served across a diversity of colonial 
spaces challenges these assumptions. As Miguel Martínez points out, the coincidence of the 
military revolution with imperial expansion meant that many early modern soldiers were 
thrust into global imperial networks, becoming both agents and subjects of empire. Their 
collective and individual stories point to an unprecedented global mobility and 
interconnectedness. Soldiers could thus be thrown into the role of empire’s victims – pawns 
within a game of military expansion, where their experiences of violence and conflict were 
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not equally matched by loyalty to the empires they served.
28
 Rather than unthinking agents of 
empire, many soldiers serving in colonial armies were subject to conditions of extreme 
deprivation, exploitation, extortion and penury. Convictism and forced or fraudulent 
recruitment were common, as were brutal and cruel punishments.
29
 At the same time, studies 
of colonial armies across a diversity of contexts have encouraged us to rethink the ethnic 
identity of the typical soldier by demonstrating the participation of slaves, free blacks, mixed 
race and indigenous peoples.
30
 
Soldiers also acted as settlers and go-betweens, marrying into local communities and 
forming relationships and alliances with indigenous and slave populations.
31
 In frontier 
regions like the Philippines, Chile and the Chichimec frontier, soldiers were often the only 
representatives of empire, and their service records thus help to enliven histories of 
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confrontation and negotiation that otherwise could not be told.
32
 While ultimately tasked with 
the job of subjugating indigenous people and extending European domination, soldiers’ 
relationships with these populations could also be subverted in times of mutiny, rebellion or 
desertion, when the boundaries between agents and subjects of empire blurred. At these 
moments, soldiers could easily be as destabilising to the imperial project as they were 
essential to it.
33
 While soldiers have traditionally been left out of the historiography of 
European expansion, as agents of empire they are nonetheless an important analytical 
category if we truly want to understand how empire was expressed and experienced.  
What follows here is a detailed social history of Spanish soldiers serving across 
Spain’s Pacific presidios. The article begins with an assessment of the origins of Spanish 
soldiers in the levies for the Philippines in New Spain. Far from the image of adventuring, 
fortune-seeking professional soldiers of pure Spanish ethnicity, the companies of soldiers 
stationed across the Pacific were comprised of half-starved, under-clothed and unpaid 
recruits, many of whom were in fact convicts, and were more likely to be Mexican mestizos 
than pure-blood Spaniards. The archetype of the quixotic conquistador is thus broken down 
not merely because most ordinary soldiers served in the Philippines involuntarily, but also 
because few were ever really rewarded for their service. From this basis we examine the 
conditions that soldiers experienced once they reached the Philippines, which often led 
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soldiers towards disloyalty in the form of desertion and mutiny. The final section considers 
how these factors impacted on the success of Spanish aims in the Pacific in the seventeenth 
century, concluding that ultimately both a chronic shortage in voluntary recruits and a lack of 
loyalty amongst those who did serve undermined ambitions to expand the project of empire 
in the Spanish Pacific. 
 
 
 
 
I.  
The Social Origins of Spanish Soldiers Serving the Pacific 
In 1617, Diego López de Miranda crossed the Pacific from New Spain to fight in the 
wars against the Dutch. An honoured soldier with an illustrious career spanning more than 
fifteen years and three continents, he had served as a military officer in Hispaniola, as captain 
of a ship in the armada off the coast of Africa, as an alférez in New Spain responsible for 
recruiting soldiers for the Philippines and as captain of infantry in Puerta de Navidad before 
finally enlisting to serve on the other side of the Pacific. Once in the Philippines, he was 
quickly promoted into the officer ranks and in 1620 he served as corporal of an aid ship sent 
to the Moluccas. Unfortunately, his ship was seized by Dutch corsairs and he was taken 
prisoner and held captive for three and a half years before finally escaping on board a tiny 
boat. As he sailed across the Celebes Sea towards the Philippines, his ship was attacked by 
Moro raiders and his arm was broken during the ensuing skirmish. He was left floating at sea 
for the next eight days. Undeterred by his travails, when he finally returned to Manila, López 
de Miranda signed up for the next armada that set sail in pursuit of the Dutch.
34
 In recognition 
of his loyalty and services to the Crown, he became captain of artillery in Panama in 1632.
35
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López de Miranda’s service record paints a colourful, swashbuckling picture of the 
mobility and adventure experienced by the military officers who traversed the Spanish empire 
in the seventeenth century. His time spent in the Philippines formed just one part of a much 
longer career that crisscrossed four continents. The service records of other officers serving in 
the Philippines also suggest that elements of López de Miranda’s story were relatively 
common. The careers of the military officers in the Philippines link almost every corner of 
the empire and beyond. Particularly in the first half of the century, many had fought in 
European theatres of war such as Flanders and Italy, while others had participated in military 
incursions into Africa or sailed on board the famed silver fleets of New Spain.
36
 Of all the 
military men serving in the Philippines, these officers were the most likely to adhere to the 
image of the conquistador portrayed in the historiography, since as career soldiers they 
benefitted through the attainment of future positions of title and prestige, if not monetary 
advantage. 
Nevertheless, we need to pause and question how accurately this story reflects the 
common experience of ordinary soldiers serving in the Philippines. Although numerical data 
across the century is patchy, what data exists suggests that Spanish soldiers numbered 
between 1,500 and 2,000 across all Philippine presidios during the course of the century.
37
 
What is also clear from official records is that this was never considered enough. An audit of 
the military needs of the Philippines in 1633 indicated that the archipelago needed to 
maintain a military presence equalling at least 2,200 soldiers in order to be able to maintain 
its defences.
38
 The major barrier to meeting these needs was simply a lack of sufficient 
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soldiers sent to the archipelago on board the galleons from New Spain. Although dispersed 
and fragmentary, the yearly accounts of the socorros
39
 sent to the Philippines during the 
seventeenth century indicate that the number of soldiers sent from Acapulco to Manila 
averaged just 156 per year.
40
 By contrast, Governors of the Philippines regularly requested 
that the Viceroys send up to 300 soldiers annually, while the King on a number of occasions 
commanded the Viceroys to organise dispatches in the order of 400 or 500 soldiers.
41
  
 
Table 1: Distribution of Spanish Soldiers in the Philippines42 
 1603 1636 1642 1644 1654 1655 1670 1672 
Manila 900 446  407 821 799 708 667 
Fort Santiago  22   50  86 81 
Cavite  70   89  225 211 
Moluccas 180 480 507  389    
Cebu 86 50     135 135 
Oton 66 50     169 169 
Cagayan 46 80     155 155 
Zamboanga  210   184    
Caraga  45     81 81 
Formosa  180       
Calamianes       73 73 
Other 255        
TOTAL 1533 1633 2067 2085 Unknown Unknown 1632 1572 
 
Table 2: Detail of Soldier Distribution in Pacific Presidios, 1670 and 167243 
Year Location Officers Soldiers Musketeers Indigenous 
officers 
Indigenous 
Soldiers 
Total 
1670 Manila 96 476 220 0 0 792 
Fort Santiago 9 66 20 4 46 145 
Cavite 48 150 75 36 355 664 
Caraga 9 81 0 6 45 141 
Calamianes 9 73 0 0 48 130 
Otón 17 169 0 6 91 283 
                                                          
39
 The socorro was the yearly supply of aid sent to the Philippines from New Spain, comprising financial, 
military and material aid. 
40
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Cagayan 17 155 0 0 51 223 
Cebú 17 135 0 6 95 253 
Governors 
guard 
2 12 0 0 0 14 
TOTAL 224 1317 315 58 731 2645 
1672 Manila 72 528 127 0 0 727 
Fort Santiago 9 61 20 6 42 138 
Cavite 44 173 38 36 251 542 
Caraga 9 81 0 6 45 141 
Calamianes 9 73 0 0 48 130 
Otón 17 169 0 6 91 283 
Cagayan 17 155 0 0 51 223 
Cebú 17 135 0 6 95 253 
Governors 
guard 
2 12 0 0 0 14 
TOTAL 196 1387 185 60 623 2451 
 
Table 3: Soldiers sent on board the galleons from Acapulco to Manila during the Seventeenth 
Century44 
Year Number  Year Number  Year Number  
1600 209  1644 255  1662 300  
1601 500  1645 254  1663 700  
1603 150  1646 141  1664 149  
1604 150  1647 0  1666 70  
1605 850  1648 81  1667 50  
1606 40  1649 136  1670 0  
1608 350  1650 54  1671 135  
1610 268  1651 0  1672 101  
1615 311  1652 0  1676 146  
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1617 0  1653 100  1680 130  
1619 156  1654 167  1684 190  
1620 407  1655 110  1685 206  
1621 170  1656 0  1686 0  
1622 482  1657 0  1687 0  
1628 250  1658 164  1688 0  
1630 0  1659 130  1689 163  
1631 80  1660 41  1692 0  
1632 90  1661 0  1693 0  
TOTAL 8,436  
Yearly Average 156  
 
These records also suggest that ordinary soldiers outnumbered officers anywhere up 
to nine times.
45
 Yet, ordinary soldiers are almost inevitably much harder to study than the 
officer class. For the most part they did not leave behind the kind of merit and service records 
that allow us to tell an individual story like the account given above of López de Miranda’s 
military career. Instead, the archives portray ordinary soldiers as a mostly shapeless mass. 
Questions regarding the origins and motivations of soldiers serving in the Philippines and 
their overall loyalty to the Spanish empire therefore need to be approached in a different way, 
beginning with the records relating to the military levies for the Philippines.  
The vast majority of soldiers serving in the Philippines were recruited from levies 
conducted in New Spain. Banners were raised across the major urban centres of New Spain in 
the months leading up to the arrival of the galleons from Manila in March or April of each 
year. Levies most commonly took place in Mexico City,
46
 Puebla de los Ángeles
47
 and 
Veracruz,
48
 but could also be held in more minor cities such as Zacatecas,
49
 Antequera,
50
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Celaya,
51
 Cuernavaca,
52
 Tlaxcala
53
 and Acapulco.
54
 In these locations appointed captains 
were instructed to establish a recruiting booth and issue a public decree that the levy was in 
progress.
55
 These levies were intended to attract voluntary recruits; however, finding 
sufficient volunteers to serve in the Philippines was a consistent and notorious problem 
throughout the seventeenth century. Deterred by the lengthy voyage across the Pacific and the 
limited prospects for returning from what was known to be a volatile and dangerous frontier, 
few soldiers ever really enlisted voluntarily. Some soldiers were even known to have paid 
officials in the port of Acapulco to be exempted from the levy before they embarked on the 
galleons bound for Manila,
56
 while others deserted while en route to Acapulco.
57
 In 1648 the 
Viceroy Conde de Salvatierra acknowledged the unpopularity of the levy, noting that recruits 
‘were always lacking, they collected men from the levies of [Mexico] City, Puebla and 
Veracruz, but from the rest of the recruitment sites there were few or none.’58  
Viceregal officials responded to the chronic shortage of voluntary recruits in two 
ways. Firstly, military officers in the Philippines came to rely much more heavily on the 
recruitment of indigenous Filipino soldiers – a complex subject which I have dealt with in 
much greater detail elsewhere.
59
 Secondly, recruiting officers in New Spain utilised a number 
of coercive means to find soldiers. A standard clause within the instructions given to 
recruiting captains charged them with issuing a pardon ‘to all of those [criminals] who within 
the first fifteen days following the pronouncement of this decree do present themselves 
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 AGN, RC, Vol. D49, expedientes 219, 220, 221, 223, 252, 269. 
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before the said captain or his deputy to enlist themselves.’60 The same captains were then 
instructed to forcibly apprehend and impress any criminals who failed to enlist in the stated 
timeframe.
61
 Yet, recruiting officers who were desperate to meet their quota often resorted to 
more informal methods of impressment. In Puebla de los Ángeles, the city council reported 
that it was commonplace for respectable citizens to be impressed into the army alongside 
vagabonds and young boys. Only a hefty bribe to the recruiting officers would secure them 
their liberty.
62
 Finally, when all of these other methods failed, viceregal officials in New 
Spain would seek to supplement the number of recruits sent to the Philippines through the 
criminal justice system. Criminals were taken off the rural highways and urban streets and 
out of the gaols of New Spain and sentenced to serve as convicts in the military of the 
Philippines under a system known as the forzado system.
63
 
Roughly a quarter of all soldiers sent to the Philippines were forzados;
64
 however, 
once we take into account the full range of coercive recruitment methods used in the levies it 
seems safe to assume that the number of soldiers serving in the Philippines against their will 
was very high, if not an outright majority. Significantly, this had an impact on the type of 
soldiers who travelled to the Philippines. Since the Philippines levies relied so heavily on 
involuntary methods of recruitment, the majority of ordinary soldiers were drawn from the 
plebe of New Spain, rather than from the ranks of career soldiers. The plebe of New Spain 
was a multiethnic underclass of criminals, idlers, vagabonds, fugitives and runaway soldiers 
and sailors who transgressed the social norms of genteel Spanish society.
65
 According to the 
Viceroys, the miscegenated nature of the plebe meant that it had absorbed all of the worst 
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characteristics of its constituent subgroups, and for this reason miscegenation was 
discouraged by the viceregal authorities.
66
 Viceroy Palafox y Mendoza described the plebe of 
New Spain as being made up of ‘negros, mulattos, mestizos ... and Indians and some fallen 
Spaniards and habitual delinquents.’ He went on to argue that ‘there runs risk among such a 
diversity of colours, nations and conditions, all of them with little light of reason and no 
shame.’67 The plebe was a particular fixture of urbanised populations in Mexico City and 
Puebla de los Ángeles, where they congregated in taverns and marketplaces and engaged in 
unruly and criminal behaviour.
68
 At the same time, an itinerant plebeian population plagued 
the highways of New Spain, engaging in acts of petty theft and highway robbery which 
threatened many of the major communication routes in New Spain.
69
 Criminals on the 
highways of New Spain were known to target large land holdings and attack travellers, 
merchants and carters travelling between settlements.
70
 
Unsurprisingly, a variety of criminal justice measures were designed to transform 
the unruly plebe of New Spain into productive members of society through forced labour 
schemes.
71
 While a number of these schemes existed, recruitment and sentencing to serve in 
the Philippines was in many ways a particularly final measure for removing unwanted social 
elements from Novohispanic society. This was certainly the intention behind the forzado 
system, if not the majority of other coercive recruitment methods used during the Philippines 
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levies.
72
 Records relating to the forzado system indicate that the majority of forzados were 
sentenced to serve in the Philippines either for property crimes including highway robbery, 
rustling and petty theft or for the ‘crimes’ of vagabondage and idleness. Although rarer, 
violent crimes such as murder and rape were also recorded.
73
 Forzados were emblematic 
representatives of the unruly plebe of New Spain, and they were thrust into the volatile 
frontier environment of the Philippines largely against their will. Far from being loyal 
servants to the Crown, the same culture of disobedience that led to their expulsion from New 
Spain travelled with them to the Philippines on board the galleons that crossed the Pacific 
each year.  
In addition to the recruitment of criminals, the Philippines levy also targeted another 
specific plebeian grouping – illegal migrants arriving in New Spain on board the Indies fleets. 
Lower class Spaniards frequently circumvented the official restrictions on migration to the 
New World by enlisting as soldiers and sailors in Spain and then deserting upon arrival in 
Veracruz. One estimate suggests that this form of illegal migration contributed as many as 
fifty percent of the annual migrants to the Indies during the seventeenth century.
74
 When they 
arrived in the New World, these soldiers and sailors would desert from their ships and 
attempt to disappear into the colony without a trace, establishing themselves in a trade, re-
enlisting in the army, or joining the ranks of the itinerant populations that roved the highways 
of New Spain. Historians such as Jonathan Israel and R. Douglas Cope have argued that the 
presence of these illegal migrants helped introduce irreverent picaresque traditions from the 
streets of Spain into the melting pot of New World society. Moreover, the presence of lower 
class Spaniards was abhorred by viceregal authorities as a threat to the established order of 
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Spanish racial superiority.
75
 This group of plebeians thus became another obvious target for 
recruitment for the Philippines. Specific commissions were given to individuals to patrol the 
highways of New Spain looking for runaway soldiers and sailors, as well as highwaymen, 
vagabonds and other criminals. In December 1648, for instance, Juan Alonzo was appointed 
‘for the duration of the recruitment for the Philippines’ to capture thieves, highwaymen, 
criminals, vagabonds and runaway soldiers in the province of Chalco.
76
 Juan Martín Gallardo 
was likewise instructed to send the runaway soldiers and sailors who he encountered to the 
Royal Gaol so that they could be enlisted in the 1645 levies for the Philippines and the 
Armada de Barlovento.
77
 
Inherent within the philosophy of socially cleansing New Spain of insubordinate 
plebeians was an assumption that such men could be transformed into not only productive but 
also loyal servants of the empire.
78
 In 1642, Viceroy Palafox argued that it was convenient to 
apprehend vagabonds for the Philippines levy every year ‘because those that are here restless 
at peace, are considerable over there in war.’79 The assumption that being transferred to one 
of the remotest parts of the empire would alter the moral character of forced recruits was 
particularly strong in relation to Spanish and mestizo soldiers. Soldiers with Spanish lineage 
were supposed to find a new pride in their race and their empire when confronted by the 
realities of the East Indies. For this reason, official instructions stipulated that soldiers 
recruited for the Philippines levy had to be ‘Spaniards and mestizos or sons of those ... and 
not elderly, friars, clerics, Indians, negros, Mulattos, nor those that have transmittable 
diseases.’80 Yet particularly in the latter half of the century, soldiers were more often than not 
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recruited from within the heterogeneous casta population of New Spain. In 1659, the royal 
officials in Manila complained that most of the soldiers who were being sent from New Spain 
were negros, mulattos and Indians, with almost no Spaniards amongst the contingents. They 
petitioned the King for more white soldiers to be sent from New Spain because of the large 
shortage of white people in the islands.
81
 Concerns about these recruits extended beyond their 
limited military training; the officials in Manila also worried about their overall loyalty to the 
imperial project in the Pacific and their capacity to combine with indigenous populations to 
form a multiethnic plebe which mirrored the plebeian underclass of New Spain.
82
  
The social engineering behind the Philippines levies were at the forefront of the 
minds of viceregal authorities in New Spain. Yet, the royal officials in the Philippines were 
far more concerned with the capacity of soldiers to perform their core duties of defence and 
pacification. Far from extolling the virtues of a glorious cohort of conquistadores, numerous 
governors throughout the seventeenth century described the men who arrived on board the 
galleons from New Spain as ‘pernicious and scandalous’. The criminal backgrounds and 
largely unfree nature of soldiers serving in the presidios ultimately meant that royal officials 
in Manila had a hard time trusting the loyalty or utility of their military forces.
83
 Seen in this 
light, the soldiers who served in the Philippines hardly meet our expected image of the 
traditional conquistador. Nevertheless, the extent to which soldiers redeemed themselves by 
proving their loyalty to the empire can only be answered by considering the conditions that 
soldiers experienced while stationed in the presidios of the Pacific.   
 
II 
Conditions in Spain’s Pacific Presidios 
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In 1660, Governor Sabiniano Manrique de Lara succinctly summarised the state of 
the Spanish infantry stationed in the Philippines. After having received just forty-one soldiers 
on board the galleons from New Spain that year, the governor noted that in the past twenty 
years of socorros, the viceroys of New Spain had not contributed a tenth of the number of 
soldiers who had died in the various wars that they had been fighting, and that the supply that 
arrived that year was not even a sixth of what they needed. This left the soldiers to ‘labour 
incessantly for the Crown so as to gain great returns and all for love ... despite the repeated 
adversity that has befallen them.’84 The governor went on to add that the soldiers were ‘on 
the brink of giving up and losing their minds because of the lack of reinforcements and aid 
sent by the viceroy’ and because of the threat of enemy assault. He likened the situation to 
that of a cancerous attack running through the flesh and bones of the ‘incorporeal body’. 
Without reinforcements, the soldiers stationed across the Philippines were forced to ‘resign 
themselves to death from a life of fatigue without resources.’85 The situation was the worst on 
the island of Ternate in the Moluccas, where the many deaths and bad conditions had led to 
mutinies and loss of loyalty amongst a soldiery faced with hopelessness. More than 120 
soldiers had died in Ternate that year, with many others running away and defecting to the 
Dutch.
86
  
Life for those in the service of empire in the seventeenth century Philippines was 
hard. For the Spanish population, Spain’s Pacific presidios were defined by the vast and 
perilous expanse of the Pacific Ocean which separated the Philippines from the viceroyalty of 
New Spain. When soldiers arrived in Manila they were distributed across a network of 
presidios spanning Spain’s Pacific territories. Soldiers were primarily intended to defend the 
archipelago against external threats and to engage in the conquest of groups that violently 
                                                          
84
 AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 9, Ramo 2, Núm. 30.  
85
 AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 23, Ramo 2, Núm. 4. AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 9, Ramo 2, Núm. 34. AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 9, 
Ramo 2, Núm. 30. 
86
 AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 9, Ramo 2, Núm. 30. AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 9, Ramo 2, Núm. 34. 
21 
 
resisted colonisation. Yet, in practice, they also supported the work of missionaries and 
helped to institute the labour and tribute systems that underpinned Spanish imperial authority 
over conquered populations. The bulk of these soldiers were stationed in Manila and Cavite, 
which through the century housed between four and seven companies, or between 400 and 
900 Spanish soldiers.
87
 These soldiers defended the city and the incoming galleon trade 
against external threats from Dutch raiders, Chinese pirates or against the threat of rebellion 
amongst the Chinese population of Manila and were also dispatched from Manila in times of 
need. Outside of Manila, soldiers were distributed across a network of presidios located in 
Cebu, Oton on the island of Panay, Cagayan in northern Luzon, the Moluccas (1606-1661), 
Zamboanga (1635-1661), Iligan and Caraga in Mindanao, Formosa (1626-1642), Calamianes 
in present day Palawan, the Mariana Islands (from 1667), Bolinao, Lampon and Pampanga.
88
 
There is evidence that the Spanish also occupied smaller locations rarely mentioned in 
administrative records, for instance in the Celebes Islands, north of Sulawesi.
89
 
Each of these presidios was located for its defensive and strategic value. The 
presidios of Cebu and Oton were jointly responsible for both the defence of the Visayas 
against Moro raiders and for organising and dispatching the socorro for the soldiers stationed 
in the Moluccas. Additionally, Cebu played the role of internally policing the indigenous 
peoples of the Visayas, and the alcalde mayor of Cebu was responsible for some considerable 
dispatches of soldiers who went to put down rebellions on the islands of Bohol and Leyte in 
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1622.
90
 The presidios on Mindanao, including Zamboanga, Caraga and Iligan, were intended 
as outposts for controlling slave raiding amongst the Moros of Mindanao, Jolo, Borneo and 
the Camucones and as bases from which to extend Spanish control over these same 
territories. As a consequence, these presidios were constantly besieged by hostile neighbours. 
The Spanish occupation of the Moluccas in 1606 and Formosa in 1626 were intended to 
create a defensive buffer against the Dutch presence in the region, although in reality both 
presidios simply created a chronic drain on Spanish resources and were eventually closed for 
this reason. In contrast, the presidios in Cagayan, Pangasinan, Pampanga and the Mariana 
Islands were bases from which the Spanish could extend their control over indigenous 
populations and counter ongoing resistance to Spanish rule. 
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Figure 1: Location of Presidios in the Seventeenth Century Spanish Pacific 
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All presidios suffered from shortages originating from a lack of sufficient silver 
arriving each year on board the galleons of New Spain. Soldiers stationed in the Philippines 
led lives exposed to poverty and hunger since the Crown lacked the means to pay them their 
wages. The Pacific crossing provided the archipelago’s main supply route for material 
supplies, money, missionaries and soldiers, yet it was constantly beset by the risk of 
shipwreck and a lack of available galleons. In the years that the galleons failed to arrive in 
Manila, the government went without supplies or money to pay their soldiers. Soldiers’ lives 
were cut short not merely from the nature of their duties, but from tropical illnesses and 
diseases which proliferated within the companies. As a consequence, soldiers turned towards 
criminality, desertion, vagabondage and mutiny, continuing many of the traditions of 
disobedience witnessed amongst similar plebeian bodies in Spain and New Spain.  
Soldiers serving in the Philippines regularly went unpaid. The socorros sent from 
New Spain included a dispatch of silver which was intended to pay the wages of all of the 
employees in the colony, from the royal officials down to the indigenous and Chinese 
labourers employed in the shipyards. Soldiers’ wages – which typically equalled 96 pesos a 
year – were also drawn from this pool of money.91 Most governors throughout the century 
felt that the amount of silver sent from New Spain was well below the needs and expectations 
of the colony. This situation led the royal treasury of Manila into a crippling debt.
92
 In 1660, 
Governor Manrique de Lara wrote that he had debts worth more than one and a half million 
pesos, not including the money owed to the indigenous labourers, soldiers, sailors, ministers 
and military and political officials.
93
 Although the shortages were exacerbated in the latter 
half of the century, similar problems were also experienced in the early decades.
94
 In 1605, 
Ríos Coronel argued that the royal treasury was known for paying the salaries of the royal 
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officials and the men employed on the galleys, and just about everyone else before paying the 
soldiers, ‘so that they might go eight or ten months or a year without [being paid] and with 
this one might consider what they might suffer.’95 A sample of pay records for the period 1 
July 1635 to 30 June 1636 indicates the haphazard nature of soldiers’ salaries. For the 
infantry of Manila, only twenty-two out of 388 soldiers were paid, and all but two of these 
soldiers were paid exactly one-third of the money that was owed to them. The average 
number of years’ salary owed to these soldiers was 2.2 years and ranged from between less 
than half a year to nearly four years. For the infantry of the Moluccas, thirty-eight out of 480 
soldiers were paid, and each again received exactly one third of what was owed to them. The 
average number of years’ salary owed to the soldiers was 3.3 years and ranged between half a 
year and 16.4 years, indicating the length of time that some soldiers had to wait to receive 
any wages.
96
  
The lack of silver in the socorro also led to shortages in material supplies, including 
clothing and munitions. In 1668, Governor Salcedo argued that shortages in the supplies sent 
from New Spain forced him to send a ship to Dutch-controlled Banda in search of iron, 
wheat, clothing and other goods, and that he had been unable to clothe his soldiers.
97
 
Shortages were felt particularly keenly in presidios such as the Moluccas and Formosa, which 
were reliant on regular shipments of aid sent from Manila. In 1632, Friar Diego Aduarte 
reported that the soldiers in Formosa had no wine to celebrate even the most important 
religious festivals, nor woollen clothing to keep them warm against the cold northern winters. 
Meanwhile, the salted meat sent from Manila was ‘hardly enough to fill a cooking pot. What 
is worse, the meat is so badly done that it is only fit to be thrown to the dogs.’98 That same 
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year, the soldiers of the main fort on Formosa fell into famine when no further supplies 
arrived from Manila.
99
  
Hunger was a common problem for soldiers throughout the century. In 1602, one 
hundred soldiers were said to have died en route from Acapulco to Manila as a result of the 
hot climate, starvation and mistreatment by their officers.
100
 In 1604, the ecclesiastic council 
of Manila claimed that the soldiers in the islands were dying of hunger and were forced to 
beg and sell their arms to support themselves.
101
 In 1658, the royal officials in Manila 
revealed that a lack of available sailors and pilots in the islands was contributing to shortages 
in food, since those available were being diverted to the Manila galleons and away from their 
ordinary responsibility of transporting rice and other goods from the provinces of the 
Philippines for the provisioning of Manila.
102
 In 1665, Governor Salcedo attempted to find a 
solution by establishing a large livestock ranch in the province of Pampanga, which would 
provide the infantry with meat even when times were tough.
103
 Very quickly, however, this 
meat was being used in lieu of wages.
104
 
While these conditions were experienced across Spain’s Pacific presidios, they were 
exacerbated in the furthest and most isolated presidios, especially in the Moluccas, located 
some 1,700 kilometres southeast of Manila. Officials struggled for decades to adequately 
provision the garrisons in the Moluccas, for want of ships as well as a lack of men willing to 
go there. A letter written by the Governor of Ternate, Lucas de Vergara de Gaviria in 1619 
indicated that the Moluccas presidios had not seen an aid ship for three years, meaning that 
the soldiers were without supplies and had not been replaced. The presidio needed 150 to 200 
soldiers but in more than a decade Vergara Gaviria had not seen more than eighty new 
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soldiers sent from Manila. He also reported that more than 200 of the soldiers had died in 
conflict with the Dutch and from sickness, and that the others were so badly treated that no 
soldiers would voluntarily serve in Ternate.
105
 Additionally, many men deserted from their 
posts, ‘fleeing by different means and particularly towards India and Portugal.’106  
 
III 
Mutiny and Desertion among Spanish Soldiers 
Poor material conditions experienced in the presidios were furthermore compounded 
by the exploitative and sometimes outright despotic behaviour of commanders and other 
authority figures. In 1634, the soldiers stationed in the presidios of the Moluccas were left 
besieged and surrounded by Dutch enemies, suffering from a shortage in supplies and 
reinforcements. That year, the Inquisitor of the Moluccas, Manuel Riberos published an edict 
forbidding the continuation of the practice of the ‘unspeakable sin’ of sodomy amongst the 
soldiers of the presidio. The edict promised to completely absolve the men of their sin if they 
ceased the practice within two months. Despite this, the Governor of the presidio, Don Pedro 
de Heredia, announced that he did not intend to uphold the absolution and would instead 
investigate and punish anyone who was found to have been practicing sodomy. In response, 
the soldiers of the Moluccas presidio staged a massive mutiny, resolving to rise up and 
murder Heredia and the other royal officials stationed in the islands. Eight days of fighting 
ensued, at the conclusion of which 150 soldiers were taken prisoner. The governor burnt and 
garrotted eleven of the mutineers, and many others died while in gaol. Forty mutineers were 
then sent back to Manila where an investigation took place and they were judged guilty of 
mutiny. These mutineers were considered to be at risk of ‘polluting’ the presidios, as well as 
inciting rebelliousness and disobedience amongst the native and Chinese populations within 
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the archipelago, and so they were punished heavily.
107
  In the wake of this investigation, 
considerable blame was laid at the feet of the Governor of the presidio, Don Pedro de 
Heredia, who was said to be corrupt and abusive and had compelled the soldiers to mutiny 
and desert to the enemy to escape the conditions found in the Moluccas.
108
 
The 1634 soldiers’ mutiny in the Moluccas was an act of desperation. Most known 
instances of mutiny amongst Spanish forces occurred in remote presidios like the Moluccas 
and Mariana Islands. Soldiers stationed in these presidios experienced degrees of isolation 
and deprivation that far exceeded the conditions of poverty and hunger that were 
commonplace across the Pacific. Soldiers stationed in the Moluccas were more likely to die 
from hunger and disease than from conflict with the Dutch. Nevertheless, the difficult 
conditions experienced within Spain’s Pacific presidios evoked different degrees of rebellion 
amongst the Spanish infantry, ranging from individual acts of desertion or disobedience to 
acts of organised, mass mutiny.  While mutinies of the scale witnessed in the Moluccas in 
1634 were relatively infrequent, desertions were much more common. The soldiers of the 
Moluccas presidios were particularly renowned for deserting, making their way towards 
Portuguese India or going as far as to join the Dutch forces and fighting against their former 
comrades and countrymen.
109
 Desertions were not limited to remote presidios, however. 
Reports from the 1650s suggest that soldiers from Cavite and Manila had abandoned their 
posts and were roaming the countryside robbing the indigenous population, since they had 
not been paid for many years and lacked any other means of supporting themselves.
110
 Even 
officers were accused of deserting. In 1619, Ríos Coronel noted that many of the officers who 
were demoted back to the ranks of ordinary soldiers had the capacity to disappear from their 
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duties and lose contact with Spanish society.
111
 Individual Spaniards could also choose to 
actively rebel against the empire, as in the case of Pedro Zapata who joined an indigenous 
rebellion in Samar in 1649 and fought against the Spanish forces before he was eventually 
killed.
112
 
The isolation of some presidios opened up the opportunity for brewing discontent to 
grow into full-scale, organised rebellion without detection, as happened in Ternate in 1634. 
Royal officials were constantly apprehensive that generalised disaffection amongst the 
infantry of the Philippines would boil over into outright mutiny. In 1604 the ecclesiastic 
council of Manila expressed the concern that the soldiers in the presidios would mutiny from 
a lack of wages.
113
 In 1628, Governor Niño de Távora argued that unless the soldiers were 
replenished and adequately paid, mutinies would break out similar to those that took place 
amongst companies serving in Flanders.
114
 In 1661, Governor Manrique de Lara justified his 
decision to withdraw the forces from the Moluccas on the basis that the conditions in the 
presidios there were so bad that not only had many soldiers died over the decades, but the 
outpost had been shaken by mutinies and a general loss of loyalty.
115
  
A proposal to completely rotate the Moluccas garrison with companies stationed in 
Manila every three years was repeatedly suggested as a way of curbing desertion and 
mutinies by providing soldiers with the prospect of return from the isolation of the Moluccas. 
Yet, even with the King’s endorsement, this proposal was never implemented, since so few 
soldiers stationed in Manila were willing to serve in the Moluccas voluntarily.
116
 Pay records 
of officers and soldiers serving in the Moluccas in 1620 indicate that the average time spent 
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serving in the islands was six and a half years, with service periods ranging from one and a 
half years up to fifteen years.
117
 Soldiers in Manila were so desperate to avoid serving in the 
Moluccas presidios that a number of mutinies were staged on board the ships transporting 
them from Manila to Ternate. This happened in 1617 when the soldiers on board the ship 
dispatched to Ternate ‘mutinied to the shame of this nation.’118 One solution to the shortage 
of voluntary recruits in the Moluccas was to enlist forzados, yet even this was not foolproof. 
In 1654, a group of forzados sentenced to serve as convicts in Ternate mutinied and seized 
their vessel and sailed for land.
119
 
Similar mutinies also plagued the supply route between Manila and the small Pacific 
outpost in the Mariana Islands in the 1680s. In this instance, however, it was the danger of the 
Pacific crossing which caused discontent amongst the soldiers and sailors on board the ships. 
Although the Marianas were settled in 1667, the establishment of a direct supply route 
between Manila and Guam was delayed until the 1680s since no pilot would risk making the 
voyage over what was known to be a particularly perilous stretch of ocean.
120
 When a vessel 
finally set sail from Manila in September 1680 under the command of Captain Francisco 
Lazcano, the crew struggled against strong winds which buffeted the ship around for nearly 
five months, eventually forcing them to turn back towards the Philippines. Frustrated by the 
failure of his voyage, Lazcano became violent and started beating and abusing his crew until 
eventually they mutinied against him and sailed the vessel back to Manila.
121
 The voyage was 
not attempted again until 1683. The famed danger of the route was so well known by this 
time, however, that very few sailors were willing to risk their lives in the crossing. Eventually 
the ship set sail with a motley crew of sailors from across the globe, including from France, 
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Greece, Venice and Sicily. One Jesuit passenger described them as ‘vile men, who as 
vagabonds had navigated a great part of the world untied in loyalty to any specific King but 
[only] to the situation and occasion that allowed them to live and support themselves.’122 
Almost inevitably, the crew turned to mutiny once more and the religious passengers had to 
join with the officers in keeping the crew in hand. They made an emergency stop to send five 
mutineers to Manila and take on reinforcements in their place, before finally completing the 
voyage to Guam.
123
  
The isolated nature of outposts such as the Marianas and the Moluccas also offered 
the possibility for widespread corruption amongst officers and royal officials. The Governor 
of the Moluccas, Pedro de Heredia, died shortly after the conclusion of the 1634 mutiny, 
however not before an investigation was initiated against him for corruption.
124
 Following his 
death, the Governor of the Philippines, Hurtado de Corcuera accused Heredia of 
systematically embezzling funds sent from Manila to Ternate by paying large amounts of 
wages principally to soldiers who had already died and those who had deserted, while 
withholding the wages of those soldiers who were present. He was also accused of selling 
goods to the soldiers at inflated prices. Rumours of this situation had spread amongst the 
soldiers stationed in Manila, and none would volunteer to serve in Ternate for fear that they 
would be forced to live ‘as slaves [como esclavos]’ without the possibility of returning to 
Manila.
125
  
The corruption allegations aimed at Pedro de Heredia are emblematic of the fact that 
royal officials could manipulate the situation of shortages and isolation to their own 
advantage. While the full extent of corruption across the Philippines is not clear, it is 
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certainly evident that corruption was endemic to isolated outposts such as the Moluccas. One 
of Heredia’s predecessors, Don Gerónimo de Silva was accused of trading away supplies sent 
to feed and clothe the garrison for his own personal gain.
126
 Meanwhile, Heredia’s successor, 
Captain Francisco Suárez de Figueroa was said to be ‘a man that by night and by day does 
not leave the gambling tables’ and his suitability as someone in charge of the distribution of 
wages and supplies was seriously questioned.
127
 Similar corruption charges were also laid 
against the governor of the Mariana Islands, Don Damian de Esplana, who was said to have 
hoarded supplies and sold them back to the soldiers at inflated prices, while keeping the 
majority of their wages for himself.
128
 
Soldiers were thus driven to rebellion not simply by the material conditions that they 
experienced in the presidios, but also in response to situations of exploitation imposed upon 
them by their officers. Yet, in addition to this, soldiers also rebelled against the more 
fundamental nature of their service in the Philippines, which was, as we have noted 
previously, often characterised by coercion and unfreedom. Instances of desertion and mutiny 
were common amongst the convict population of the Philippines. Forzados frequently 
attempted to desert from their companies. In 1602, Governor Acuña noted that the forzados 
sent to the Philippines had a habit of escaping, although he was unsure how they were able to 
achieve this. The vastness of the Philippines allowed them to simply disappear and it was 
virtually impossible to find them once this had happened.
129
 Similarly, the oidor Diego 
Calderón y Serrano noted in 1677 that forzados arriving in the Philippines often escaped and 
went to live amongst indigenous or Chinese communities and frequently engaged in ‘robbing 
the indigenous of their beasts of burden and devastating the ranches [estancias] of their 
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livestock.’ 130  Some convicts even found their way back to New Spain, 131  While others 
attempted shipboard mutinies even before they reached Manila.
132
  
The most noteworthy cases of mutiny amongst both forzados and ordinary soldiers 
occurred in Guam in the 1680s.
133
 Between the years 1684 and 1690, Guam witnessed a total 
of five attempted and actual mutinies.
134
 The most successful of these occurred in 1688, when 
a group of soldiers, led by a Mexican convict, seized control of the island for a period of three 
months, placing their governor and military commander in chains. The actions of these 
soldiers sent shockwaves across the Pacific, from Manila to Mexico City, and convinced 
many royal officials that the transport in convicts across the Pacific was both undesirable and 
dangerous.
135
 Instances such as this placed doubt in the minds of many royal officials on both 
sides of the Pacific about the utility of the forzado system as an effective criminal justice 
method, since it was apparent that the Philippine authorities lacked the capacity to adequately 
control the forzado population, and relied on them to supplement their military 
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weaknesses.
136
Nonetheless, forzado transportation continued and just barely two years after 
the conclusion of the 1688 mutiny, a group of more than forty convicts were shipwrecked off 
the coast of the Mariana Islands. The colony readily accepted them and put them to work, yet 
within a matter of months these convicts hatched a conspiracy to murder all of the 
missionaries and royal officials in Guam, seize a ship and set sail for Peru. The plot was 
discovered before it could be carried out and twenty three of the would-be mutineers were 
executed. The rest of the convicts were kept in irons and later sent to Manila.
137
 
 
IV 
Spanish Soldiers and the Unravelling of Empire 
The episodes of mutiny in presidios like the Moluccas and Mariana Islands reveal 
something stark about the nature of military service in the Spanish Pacific. As often forced 
and coerced recruits, subject to conditions of material deprivation, isolation and cruelty from 
their commanding officers, the loyalty of Spanish soldiers to the imperial project was sorely 
tested. Although these soldiers were essential to the establishment of Spanish rule in the 
Philippines, their disobedient actions could equally precipitate the unravelling of empire. This 
is most evident when we consider the final factor of soldiers’ life in the Spanish Pacific – 
their involvement in the defence of Spanish outposts against both external and internal 
threats. More often than not, we find that a chronic shortage in voluntary recruits coupled 
with a lack of sufficient supplies crippled the defensive capabilities of the colony and forced 
the authorities in Manila into a tenuous over-reliance on indigenous soldiers.  
This impact was most strongly felt at the height of the Hispano-Dutch War, when 
soldiers were forced into regular confrontation with Dutch naval forces intent on disrupting 
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the Spanish presence in the East Indies. Shortages of soldiers were felt particularly keenly in 
remote presidios such as the Moluccas and Formosa, where the Spanish forts were 
established in close proximity to Dutch forts located on the same islands. The Dutch regularly 
set up naval ambushes to engage the ships arriving in the Moluccas with aid and military 
reinforcements from Manila. One such instance occurred in 1628, when the Dutch engaged a 
number of Spanish ships entering the narrow strait between the islands of Ternate and Tidore. 
The Dutch pursued the Spanish vessels towards their port and eventually overtook one of the 
ships and forced it to run aground, causing all of the soldiers to fall into the water. The 
remaining Spanish vessel prepared to fight, but they were quickly overpowered when the 
Dutch sent a cannonball flying squarely into the Spanish gunpowder stores, causing the ship 
to explode. After the ship had burnt itself out, the Dutch salvaged 3,000 pesos and other 
goods that were destined as aid for the soldiers stationed in the presidio. Twenty Spaniards, 
fifteen convicts and two captains of infantry died during the battle.
138
 While not all of these 
encounters favoured the Dutch side,
139
 the actions of the Dutch in the Moluccas were enough 
to encourage some governors to consider abandoning the position altogether.
140
 
Possibly the most devastating defeat during the seventeenth century was the loss of 
Formosa to the Dutch in 1642. In the late 1630s, Governor Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera 
had deemed Formosa of secondary importance to Spanish interests in the Philippines and had 
systematically starved the presidios in Formosa of both men and supplies in order to free up 
resources for other presidios.
141
 On the eve of the successful Dutch invasion, the Governor of 
Formosa wrote to Manila and described the soldiers as ‘few and most of them are boys and 
puny natives.’ The better quality soldiers had left the islands, and those who were left were 
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incapable of military action. A previous invasion by the Dutch had been met with no 
resistance, according to the governor, ‘not because I had faltered in the desire to fight, but 
because I had no one left.’142 Shortly after this, the Dutch captured the Spanish fort in Jilong 
and expelled the Spanish from the island altogether. 
At the same time, Spanish aims of subjugating indigenous populations and 
transforming them into tribute paying members of the empire were also frustrated due to a 
lack of sufficient military strength. Major uprisings throughout the seventeenth century led to 
significant contractions of territorial control. This occurred notably in the province of 
Cagayan in the 1620s, when a large-scale indigenous uprising resulted in the complete 
expulsion of Spanish missionaries and soldiers for more than half a century.
143
 Some areas of 
this province were never brought back under Spanish control.
144
 Moreover, maroon 
communities across Northern Luzon continued to run raiding missions against Spanish 
settlements for the duration of the seventeenth century, with Spanish forces rarely able to 
retaliate in any meaningful way.
145
 A similar observation can be made about the Muslim 
territories of Mindanao and Jolo. Although these islands were the sites of the two greatest 
military victories that Spain boasted in the Philippines during the seventeenth century, these 
victories were in reality very fleeting.
146
 Spain never managed to exercise any meaningful 
power in these regions and was forced to withdraw completely in 1663.
147
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Yet despite these vulnerabilities and almost against all odds, the Spanish managed to 
retain a presence in the Pacific and over the course of the seventeenth century slowly 
consolidated their control within the heartlands of Central Luzon and parts of the Visayas. 
Although they succumbed to the Dutch in the Moluccas and Formosa, to the Moros in 
Mindanao and Jolo and to the Maroon communities of Northern Luzon, by the end of the 
century Spanish society was more or less permanently settled in the Philippines. That they 
were able to achieve this is perhaps testimony to the innovative means with which successive 
governors attempted to address their military weaknesses. The most notable of these means 
was the widespread recruitment of indigenous soldiers to supplement – and in many cases 
completely outnumber – the Spanish troops. Indigenous soldiers were mobilised in 
extraordinary levies in times of need for defensive expeditions of conquest against the Dutch 
or Moros, expeditions of conquest, or in times of indigenous rebellion. Over the course of the 
century, we have records for at least 31,445 indigenous soldiers being levied in this way.
148
  
 
V 
Conclusion 
The gradual reliance on indigenous Filipinos for the conquest and control of other 
indigenous populations represents a final acknowledgment by Spanish officials that their own 
forces were insufficient and unreliable. Yet, more than this, it also highlights the inadequacy 
of colonial scholarship which has traditionally attempted to construct an unassailable 
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conquered-conqueror dichotomy. Recently, historian Matthew Restall has interrogated the 
historical image of the Spanish conquistador, arguing that centuries of reimagining the 
Spanish conquests of the Americas has constructed the conquistador as an ahistorical, 
immortal hero, represented as a glorious, professional soldier capable of the ultimate 
domination of heathen peoples. Yet, the initial conquests of the Americas took place before 
the advent of the military revolution in Europe, and thus the men who served in these 
conquests hardly meet our idea of professional soldiers.
149
 James Lockhart’s famous study of 
the conquistadors of Cajamarca similarly attests to these conclusions.
150
 These same myths 
have had an impact on our understanding of the ordinary soldiers who consolidated Spanish 
territorial gains across the New World in the centuries that followed. Viewed simply as the 
heirs of the conquistador heroes of centuries past, these soldiers have been denied their own 
agency as historical subjects within the project of empire building. They have consequently 
attracted very little interest from historians of empire. 
This article has sought to demonstrate that we not only have to confront our 
understanding of the agency of indigenous people in the face of empire, but also of those who 
have traditionally been considered empire’s greatest protagonists. Spanish soldiers serving in 
the Pacific were themselves subjects, and at times victims, of empire. Uprooted from their 
communities in Spain and New Spain by the larger socio-economic changes that 
accompanied imperial expansion, many were vagabonds, petty criminals, highwaymen and 
illegal immigrants in addition to playing the role of soldier in the further reaches of the 
empire. Their relationship to empire was thus much more complex than is often 
acknowledged. 
Our understanding of early modern empire construction can thus be reshaped 
through an analysis that looks beyond intellectual, political and administrative origins 
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towards the people who actually undertook the project of colonisation. On the colonial 
frontier, we see European empires adopting military recruitment strategies from Europe – 
including forced conscription, convictism, and a reliance on vagabonds and other 
‘undesirables’ – yet the unique environment of the frontier changed the nature of this military 
service. In the seventeenth century Philippines, two thousand soldiers were given the task of 
conquering, pacifying and controlling more than a million Philippine indios,
151
 while 
defending the borders of the empire against attack from competing European rivals as well as 
powerful Southeast Asian communities. Within this tenuous context, the origin of soldiers 
and the conditions under which they served become important factors not only for 
considering the efficacy of empire building in Southeast Asia, but also in challenging the 
myth of an unassailable European dominance.  
 Humanising and complicating the face of imperialism thus helps to demonstrate the 
ways in which empire was constantly contested from both within and without. While soldiers 
stationed in the Pacific were involved in continuous acts of conquest, pacification and the 
imposition of imperial control, they did not necessarily engage in these acts by their own free 
will. Their support was for the most part tacit, but could turn quickly into dissent when they 
chose to mutiny or desert. Ultimately the story of the soldiers who served in the Philippines 
undermines a teleological view of empire and demonstrates that – at least in the first century 
or so of the Spanish presence in the Pacific – the continuity of empire was always fragile and 
uncertain.  
Yet, we know that the Spanish presence in the Pacific continued for two centuries 
after the close of this narrative. The Manila galleons continued to criss-cross the Pacific up 
until the Mexican Wars of Independence in 1810, carrying with them cargoes of silk and 
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silver as well as soldiers and forzados. Throughout the eighteenth century, the Philippines 
became a common place of exile for social miscreants and political dissidents.
152
 Many of 
those who crossed the Pacific found a home within Filipino communities by taking Filipina 
wives.
153
 As García de los Arcos has also noted, not all of the Spaniards who married into 
Filipino communities necessarily did so with the blessing of Spanish authorities. Numerous 
cases exist in the late eighteenth century of Spanish soldiers who deserted their posts to live 
within indigenous communities, often outside of Spanish control.
154
 Hence, even though 
empire persisted in the region, the stories presented here demonstrate that an exclusive focus 
on the victimisation of indigenous people and the monolithic dominance of Spain denies the 
complexities of confrontation and contestation that defined life in the Spanish Pacific. Our 
world as we live it now – delineated by borders and nations, rather than empires and island 
communities – was shaped as much by this history of contestation and negotiation as it was 
by the realities of oppression and exploitation which empire so commonly wreaked. 
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